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The Burlington Presidency
As executive vice-president and then president 
of the Great Northern, Budd had been a director 
of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy since 1916. 
Consequently he was thoroughly familiar with the 
property and problems of the vast system that 
linked Chicago with the Twin Cities, Denver, and 
Kansas City, and, through its subsidiaries (the 
Colorado & Southern and Fort Worth & Denver 
City), with Amarillo, Fort Worth, Dallas, Hous­
ton, and Galveston. Actually the C.B.6Q. alone 
was and is longer than either of the companies 
that own it; in 1932 it operated 9,262 miles of road 
as compared with 8,409 for the Great Northern 
and 6,736 for the Northern Pacific. In addition, 
the C.B.&Q. controlled, as it does today, the Colo­
rado & Southern and the Fort Worth & Denver 
City which then had a combined mileage of 2,052, 
making a total of 11,314 for the Burlington Lines. 
As of 1932, freight tonnage moved by the Bur­
lington System slightly exceeded the combined 
total of that moved by the Great Northern and 
Northern Pacific; Burlington Lines’ gross revenues 
in that year were over half again as much as for 
the Great Northern, and almost double that of the 
Northern Pacific. Thus, when Ralph Budd be-
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came president of the Burlington Lines on Janu­
ary 1, 1932, he was stepping into an even more 
responsible and more powerful position than he 
held as president of the Great Northern.
The condition of the Burlington in 1932, how­
ever, was a challenge indeed. From its very earli­
est days, the railroad had been extraordinarily 
prosperous. Throughout its first half century it 
was carefully and conservatively managed by 
John Murray Forbes of Boston and his associates. 
As a member of the so-called Hill Lines since 
1901, it had not only maintained its earlier tradi­
tions, but benefited by the guidance of one of the 
most efficient managerial groups in the country. 
Furthermore, the system occupied a territory that 
supplied extremely well-balanced traffic; it served 
the heart of the corn and wheat area, linked the 
major manufacturing and distributing centers of 
the Midwest, and was well placed to receive a 
steady flow of coal and lumber traffic. On the 
other hand, as a “Granger road” it was peculiarly 
sensitive to agricultural depression. When Budd 
arrived, the Burlington Lines’ freight revenues 
of over one hundred twenty-seven million dollars 
in 1930 were on their way down to seventy-three 
million in 1932. Budd rolled up his sleeves and 
went to work.
The very first thing he did was to reduce the 
number of operating divisions from seventeen to 
eleven, thus simplifying administration. Mean-
while he turned his eyes to the western end of the 
system where, it seemed to him, the road was 
missing a golden opportunity.
Ever since 1882 the Burlington had been the 
short route between Chicago and Denver. This 
splendid main line of over a thousand miles was 
obviously one of the greatest potential earners on 
the system. Yet the Burlington's share of through 
traffic moving between Chicago and the West 
Coast via Denver was pitifully small. The reason 
was obvious: the essential link between Denver 
and Salt Lake City (where connection could be 
made with both the Western Pacific and the 
Southern Pacific) was the Denver & Rio Grande 
Western which, from Denver, first went south to 
Colorado Springs where it interchanged traffic 
with the Rock Island, then further south to Pueblo 
where it interchanged traffic with the Missouri 
Pacific. Only there did it turn westward over the 
mountains toward Salt Lake City. Since the Rio 
Grande received the same rate on through traffic 
whether picked up at Denver, Colorado Springs, 
or Pueblo, that company naturally favored traffic 
which it had to haul for the least distance, namely 
that of the Missouri Pacific, with the Rock Island 
next in order. The Burlington ran a very poor 
third. Budd’s problem was to figure out a way by 
which the Burlington could attract a really sub­
stantial share of this transcontinental movement.
At first glance the situation seemed hopeless,
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but there was a simple solution. In 1928 the Den­
ver & Salt Lake Railroad, which ran directly west 
from Denver, had completed the six mile MofFatt 
Tunnel through the Rockies. On the other side of 
the mountains the line continued due west as far 
as Orestod before it veered northward toward 
Steamboat Springs and Craig. Yet Orestod was 
only some forty miles from the main line of the 
Rio Grande at Dotsero between Pueblo and Salt 
Lake City. If that gap could be filled it would 
shorten the combined Denver & Salt Lake-Denver 
& Rio Grande line between Denver and Salt Lake 
by one hundred seventy-five miles, as well as pro­
vide a route with a maximum grade of 2% as 
against the 3% eastbound grade by way of 
Pueblo and over Tennessee Pass. So far as the 
Rio Grande was concerned, construction of a cut­
off would mean that Denver would be closer to 
Salt Lake than either Colorado Springs or Pueblo, 
and that therefore the Rio Grande would have to 
haul traffic to and from the Burlington over a less 
distance than traffic to or from either the Rock 
Island or the Missouri Pacific.
But how could the Rio Grande be induced to 
construct this cutoff? At that time it was con­
trolled equally by the Western Pacific and the 
Missouri Pacific. There seemed little likelihood 
that the latter interests would permit the Rio 
Grande to short-circuit their own transcontinental 
route.
RALPH BUDD: RAILROAD M A N
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T W O  O F  RALPH B U D D 'S  I N N O V A T I O N S
Courtesy B urlington  Lines
T h e  o rig inal B urling ton  Zephyr  w hich  in au g u ra ted  a new  ag e  in ra ilroad  h isto ry  
w h en  it sped from D en v er to C h icag o  on M a y  26, 1934, in th irteen  hours and  five 
m inutes.
Courtesy Burlington Lines
A n o th e r first for the B urling ton  du ring  R alph  Budd s adm in istra tion  w as the 
in troduc tion  of the dom e c a r  in 1945, g rea tly  add ing  to  the p leasu re  of passengers 
in scenic regions.
i
As it happened, however, the man who effec­
tively controlled the Western Pacific was Arthur 
Curtiss James. He was also a director of the Bur­
lington, and had long been a close friend of Ralph 
Budd and a vigorous supporter of the Great 
Northern. Consequently he shared Budd’s ear­
nest desire to develop Denver as a gateway for 
Rio Grande-Burlington traffic. So it was that from 
the moment Budd became president of the Bur­
lington, he sought James’ aid in forcing construc­
tion of the cutoff. James was willing enough, but 
could hardly find fault with the perfectly reason­
able improvements the Rio Grande was making on 
its existing main line. It was Budd who finally 
provided the answer. “I’ve been most of my life 
on a railroad that is either owned equally by two 
other railroads, or on one that owns equally some 
railroads,’’ he told James, “and I've learned that 
one party in such a deal can stop improvement 
work, but it takes two of them to go ahead and do
. tfit.
James immediately grasped the point. Without 
criticizing what the Rio Grande was doing on its 
Pueblo Line, he simply insisted that equal consid­
eration be given to the cutoff. At first it was ob­
jected that the terrain to be covered was so rug­
ged that construction was virtually impossible. 
But the maps and profiles showed that the line 
was, as Budd put it, “just an ordinary Rocky 
Mountain canyon route,” not nearly so rugged as
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the Deschutes Canyon and not approaching in 
difficulties the Feather River Canyon. Work be­
gan almost at once, and in 1934 the Dotsero Cut­
off was completed and put into service.
Within the next few years the Burlington’s 
transcontinental business through Denver quad­
rupled. Wfiereas Denver had previously been 
ranked behind Chicago, Kansas City, the Twin 
Cities, St. Louis, and even Billings as an inter­
change point, it moved by 1942 into the number 
three position, and at times threatened even Kan­
sas City for second place. There was perhaps no 
better indication of the new importance of the 
Denver gateway than the fact that the Rock 
Island shifted its interchange from Colorado 
Springs to Denver. Incidentally, the opening of 
the Denver gateway for transcontinental traffic 
proved to be an enormous boon in World War II; 
had the short line not been in existence, the total 
defense effort would have been seriously handi­
capped.
Without any doubt Budd’s most important 
achievement while on the Burlington, and indeed 
over the course of his long career, was the inaugu­
ration of the first streamlined train to be powered 
by a Diesel-electric locomotive. Perhaps no major 
innovation, unless it were the development of the 
electric light, has been so much the product of one 
man’s imagination and courage.
No one knew better than Ralph Budd that the
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railroads' profits came from freight, hence every­
thing possible was done to increase freight traffic 
and to handle it at low cost. The passenger busi­
ness, however, presented a serious problem on ac­
count of its steady decline and the great difficulty 
encountered in reducing service when the traffic 
failed to support it. Budd’s idea was to attract 
passenger travel by faster and better service and 
at the same time reduce the cost of service. To 
that end, a light-weight high-speed streamlined 
train was proposed.
The best people to build such a train, he rea­
soned, were those who had already gained some 
experience in light-weight body construction in 
the automotive field; the old established railway 
car builders were still too wedded to the theory of 
massive weight and traditional design. So it was 
that early in 1933 the Burlington ordered from the 
Edward G. Budd Company in Philadelphia a 
3-car stainless steel train to be built along aero­
dynamic lines, to weigh less than 170,000 pounds, 
and to have a total seating capacity of seventy. Its 
cost was estimated at approximately $200,000.
As yet, however, it had not been decided how 
to power the new train. The Union Pacific, which 
was also building a streamliner, had settled upon 
a gas distillate engine, a precedent that the Bur­
lington might have followed. But as one historian 
of the Diesel has put it, "Budd was ready for 
something new." He turned to the Electro-Motive
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Corporation, and at Cleveland was shown two 
eight-cylinder Diesels then being constructed for 
exhibition at the Chicago Fair. With the superb 
performance of the Cascade Tunnel Diesels fresh 
in his mind, Budd felt he was on the right track. 
As soon as the engines were installed, he watched 
and checked their performance with an eagle eye.
The job those engines were doing, of course, 
was a far cry from the demands that would be put 
on them in locomotive service. But Budd decided 
they could be adapted to provide power for a 
train. At first Electro-Motive officers were dubi­
ous, but they well realized what a revolutionary 
advance could be made if the experiment worked; 
they accepted the order, and challenge, that Budd 
gave them in mid-June, 1933. "Thus it happened/* 
wrote an Electro-Motive spokesman some years 
later, "that a railroad president forced the issue 
and speeded the acceptance of Diesel motive pow­
er for the nation’s railroads."
The Pioneer Zephyr was delivered to the Bur­
lington in Philadelphia on April 7, 1934. On its 
first trial trip it reached a speed of 104 miles an 
hour, and thereupon set out for a tour of the 
country where thousands flocked to see it. The 
event that startled the nation, however, was this 
little train’s non-stop run from Denver to Chicago 
on May 26, 1934. Probably no single comparable 
event in modern times has had more advance pub­
licity and at the same time less experience on which
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to predicate a successful outcome. Budd’s pro­
posal was daring to say the least; his idea was to 
leave Denver at dawn and, without a single stop, 
run the Zephyr on to the stage of the World’s 
Fair on the shores of Lake Michigan for the clos­
ing scene in the Pageant “Wings of a Century.” 
Until then, the fastest scheduled steam run was 
approximately 26 hours, yet if the little Zephyr 
were to do what Budd promised, it would have to 
cover 1,015 miles in not more than fourteen hours. 
Nevertheless, the commitment was made, and it 
was literally true that on the appointed day the 
eyes of the nation were upon Denver.
How that run almost failed before it ever got 
started has become a legend, for to the horror of 
all concerned it was discovered, some twelve 
hours before the scheduled starting time, that one 
of the motor armature bearings was cracked and 
would have to be replaced. As the hours ticked 
away, no such bearing could be found. Not until 
evening was it discovered that the Union Pacific 
people had a motor in Omaha from which, sports­
manlike rivals that they were, they would be will­
ing to pull the necessary bearing; conceivably it 
could be brought by chartered plane to Denver in 
time for installation. That was the state of things 
when Ralph Budd went on the air to make a 
pre-arranged broadcast about the morrow’s trip. 
Down at the shop where the essential bearing had 
not yet arrived, the workers clustered around the
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radio wondering what Budd would say. His 
opening remark told the story: ‘Tomorrow at
dawn we 11 be on our way!” He went on to invite 
people all along the right of way to watch the new 
train flash by. If ever a man burned his bridges 
behind him, this was the time. It was past mid­
night when the new bearing arrived. At 5:05 a.m. 
the next morning the Pioneer Zephyr, more than 
an hour late, left Denver.
For awhile speed had to be held down to 50 
miles an hour to allow the new bearing to work 
itself in, but when it once did so, the little train 
gathered momentum. All along the right of way, 
and at the 1,600-odd grade crossings, were crowds 
to watch. Hour after hour the Zephyr sped on, 
while Ralph Budd, among other things, calmly 
shaved with a straight-edged razor simply to find 
out whether the train was running as smoothly as 
he thought it would. It was.
Yet, just when all seemed going well, someone 
inadvertently slammed a door on an electric cable, 
setting up a short circuit that burned out the start­
ing mechanism. Frantically men searched for a 
piece of wire and in the nick of time spliced the 
break; when the job was done the Zephyr had 
slowed to 15 miles an hour.
That was not the only near-stop, but it was the 
most serious. By a combination of quick thinking, 
brilliant improvisation, and just plain determina­
tion, the little Zephyr kept going until, at 7:10
p.m., thirteen hours and five minutes after leaving 
Denver, it reached the Chicago city limits. With­
out stopping it went on to the lake front and at 
exactly 8:09 p.m. rolled on to the stage of the 
Wings of the Century. Bedlam broke loose. A 
new age had dawned for the railroads.
Throughout Ralph Budd’s administration, the 
Burlington was in the forefront of Diesel develop­
ment. By the time he retired in 1949 over 80% 
of the system's passenger trains and over half of 
its freight trains were Diesel powered, while the 
fastest regularly scheduled train in the nation rode 
Burlington rails between Chicago and the Twin 
Cities. What the Diesel engine meant in carrying 
the enormous burden of World War II traffic 
could hardly be estimated. Today it is merely a 
matter of a year or two before all regularly sched­
uled operations on the Burlington, and on virtu­
ally every other road, will be handled by Diesel 
power.
Ralph Budd would be the last man in the world 
to call this a one-man revolution. Facts, however, 
speak louder than pleas of modesty, facts that 
brought to Budd the highest honors bestowed by 
the nation’s national engineering societies for his 
“vision and courageous leadership in advancing 
the technological frontiers of high speed railroad 
transportation."
So many specific achievements of Ralph Budd 
were spectacular in themselves that attention is
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easily diverted from the common denominator pol­
icies that underlay particular projects. In respect 
to railroad lines, for example, Budd was always 
convinced that maximum use should be made of 
the most efficient route between any two points 
rather than dispersing effort and expense over du­
plicate or less efficient lines. Consequently he was 
persistently in favor of intelligent consolidation of 
railroads. By the same token, he was in favor of 
letting each type of carrier specialize in the sort 
of transportation for which it was best fitted.
The opening of the Denver gateway and the 
coordination of through freight service on the part 
of the Burlington, Rio Grande, and Western Pa­
cific was a case in point. Nor was Budd the man 
to rest on his oars if a promising start warranted 
further effort in the same direction. If the Dotsero 
Cutoff route was a good one for freight, why not 
take advantage of it for through passenger ser­
vice? The scenery through the heart of the Rockies 
and along the Feather River Canyon through the 
Sierras in California was unsurpassed, and al­
though the length of that route would not permit 
competition time-wise with the Union Pacific- 
Southern Pacific to San Francisco, there might be 
many people who would prefer a more leisurely, 
more comfortable, and far more scenic journey. 
Consequently, in June, 1939, Budd persuaded the 
Rio Grande and Western Pacific to join the Bur­
lington in establishing a through daily train known
as the Exposition Flyer. Inaugurated originally 
simply to run during the summers, it became so 
popular that it was retained as a year-around 
train. Just ten years later it was replaced with the 
spanking new stainless steel California Zephyr, 
one of the most popular transcontinental trains on 
the continent.
Quite a different undertaking, yet one linked to 
it so far as basic policy was concerned was the at­
tempt of the Burlington and six other railroads to 
take over the tottering Minneapolis & St. Louis. 
The main line of this road proceeded in a wide, 
round-about arc southward from the Twin Cities 
and then eastward to Peoria. Linder prosperous 
conditions it carried overflow traffic from more 
direct routes, and sought to capitalize on the fact 
that it by-passed the crowded Chicago area. But 
during the depression it had become hopelessly 
bankrupt, and showed little prospect of being able 
to recover and continue as an independent system. 
Consequently Budd eagerly seized upon a plan 
devised by John Barriger, then in charge of rail­
road matters for the Reconstruction Finance Cor­
poration, for parcelling out approximately one 
thousand miles of the M.&St.L. to seven major ad­
joining carriers. The remaining three hundred 
miles, for which there seemed little justification, 
were to be abandoned. Under the proposed 
scheme, among other things, the Burlington would 
gain a shorter line between Peoria and Iowa.
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In Ralph BudcTs opinion, the plan was eminent­
ly logical. It would, as he put it, have cleared out 
dead wood from the railroad forest, and would 
have enabled neighboring carriers—which obvi­
ously had to remain in business anyway—to pro­
vide far better service in a more rational fashion 
than the ailing Minneapolis & St. Louis could do. 
The entire project, furthermore, was squarely in 
line with the coordination principles set out in the 
Transportation Act of 1920.
Naturally enough, however, the new and vig­
orous receiver of the M.&St.L., Lucian Sprague 
(who, incidentally, learned his railroading on the 
Burlington) as well as many of the local communi­
ties strongly opposed the plan and in 1938 it was 
denied by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
Although the road has since made a gratifying re­
covery, Budd still feels that a splendid opportu­
nity was missed to rationalize the railway plant.
Rearrangement of railway lines was by no 
means the only way to achieve coordination of the 
total transportation effort. As president of the 
Great Northern, Budd had been one of the first 
to substitute busses for branch line passenger 
trains. And as a director of the Burlington he had, 
of course, supported incorporation of the Burling­
ton Transportation Company in 1929 with power 
to operate busses on the public highways. In 1934, 
through bus service was extended to Omaha, Den­
ver, and on to Los Angeles.
In 1937, in line with Budd’s policy of coordina­
tion, Burlington Transportation Company joined 
with similar organizations controlled by the Santa 
Fe and the Missouri Pacific to form the National 
Trail ways System which thereupon became, and 
still is, the most active competitor of the Grey­
hound Lines. Budd realized, however, that the 
operation of such an extensive bus system was a 
separate undertaking in itself; the major interest 
of the railroad in busses was to provide supple­
mentary service for the patrons in its area, as well 
as a feeder system for its main line. When it be­
came apparent that the Trailways would provide 
this service even if they were independent, the 
Burlington (in 1946) sold out its interest in the 
organization at a handsome profit.
The relation of trucks to Burlington rail service, 
however, was a different proposition. Trucks 
could perform a permanent feeder service to the 
main line, and in many instances act as substitutes 
for way freights on lines which might well be 
abandoned. Hence in 1935 the original Burling­
ton Transportation Company (initially organ­
ized simply to operate busses) established a truck 
division. When the transportation company was 
sold it conveyed all its truck rights and property 
to a new, wholly-owned subsidiary of the C. B. & 
Q. known as the Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. 
This organization has expanded steadily since 
that time and now conducts a full-fledged truck
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business in competition with independent truck 
lines, and offers as well a feeder and supplement 
tary service for the entire Burlington system. In- 
cidentally, as early as 1940 the C.B.&Q. was 
transporting its truck trailers on flat cars between 
Chicago and Kansas City and to such major in- 
termediate points as Galesburg.
Although the Burlington had little difficulty in 
securing approval for acquisition and development 
of its truck lines, it failed to gain authority for a 
logical supplementary passenger service. In July, 
1943, Budd sought to set up helicopter service 
from such cities as Peoria and Des Moines to 
nearby division points on the Burlington main line 
like Galesburg and Ottumwa where all trains stop. 
But because the C. B. & Q. already owned a bus 
service, the government contended that approval 
of the proposed helicopter plan would constitute 
a monopoly of transportation despite Budd’s vig­
orous contention that there were already many 
other competing services such as independent bus 
lines, air lines, and the private automobile. These 
arguments were to no avail, however, and the 
rather exciting proposal was turned down.
Another attempt on Budd’s part to rationalize 
an unwieldly situation met with obstacles of a dif­
ferent sort. To all intents and purposes the main 
route from Denver southeastward through Colo­
rado Springs, Trinidad, the Texas Panhandle, 
Fort Worth, Dallas, and Houston, was a unified
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transportation agency. It had been conceived as 
such by the two forceful men who built it, Gover­
nor John Evans of Colorado and General Gren­
ville Dodge, and from the time of its completion in 
1888, had operated as such. From a corporate 
standpoint, however, it was two separate entities: 
the Colorado & Southern from Denver southward 
to the Texas state line, and from there on the Fort 
Worth & Denver City Railway, even though the 
C. & S. owned virtually all the stock of the Texas 
road.
During the depression years these two western 
subsidiaries suffered heavily not only from de­
pressed conditions but from long droughts; the 
C. & S. in particular found itself in desperate fi­
nancial straits toward the end of the 1930 s. Un­
der the circumstances, it seemed obvious to Budd 
that tremendous economies could be effected by 
unified operation. Because the C. & S. charter 
was far more flexible than that of its Texas part­
ner, the logical step was to lease the Fort Worth 
& Denver to the C. & S., and in 1939 that com­
pany asked the I.C.C. for permission to do so.
Thereupon a veritable storm broke loose in 
Texas. Amon Carter, powerful journalist and 
civic leader in Fort Worth, dubbed the proposal 
a “Burlington Blitzkrieg,“ threatened to have the 
line boycotted by shippers, and even proposed 
building a parallel highway to be christened, in 
derision, the “Ralph Budd Highway.“ Not even
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a personal visit on Budd’s part could mollify Car­
ter or his fellow Texans, who regarded the pro­
posal as a mortal affront to the sovereignty of the 
Lone Star State. The I.C.C., however, impressed 
by the obvious economies that could be realized, 
at first authorized the proposal. The Texans, of 
course, appealed the decision and while the matter 
was pending the Transportation Act of 1940, 
which carried an amendment concerning the pro­
tection of jobs, became law. The Act furnished a 
reason for reopening the proceedings and in due 
course the I.C.C. rejected the proposal.
As always, Budd accepted the outcome philo­
sophically and in the next two years worked out 
an ingenious proposal for refinancing the Colo­
rado & Southern separately and putting it on the 
way to recovery. One novel aspect of that debt 
adjustment plan was the Burlington’s pledge not 
to declare or accept dividends from the Colorado 
& Southern during the life of the plan. Actually 
the C.B.6.Q. had no obligation whatever toward 
the bondholders of the C.&.S., but it was Budd’s 
feeling that they probably bought the bonds be­
cause the C.&.S. was a part of the Burlington sys­
tem, and that the ordinary dictates of fair play 
made it only reasonable for the Burlington volun­
tarily to do its part to help its subsidiary back on 
its feet. So well did the debt adjustment plan work 
that when Budd retired from the Burlington in 
1949, the C.&S. was again financially sound.
Meanwhile, typically enough, Budd had per­
suaded Amon Carter to bury the hatchet. As a 
result there was no objection in Texas when, in 
1951, the F.W.8D.C. sought for and obtained an 
amendment of its charter which enabled it to ab­
sorb the several branch lines in Texas which pre­
viously had been owned by the Colorado & South­
ern, and to simplify its own financial structure so 
that in the end most of the economies Budd had 
visualized in 1939 were realized.
A strikingly similar and equally important step 
took place on the C.B.&Q. proper in respect to the 
development of an efficient Chicago-Kansas City 
line. Way back in 1859 the old Hannibal 6 St. 
Joseph connected the cities named in its title by a 
railroad which was then the westernmost portion 
of the national network. Immediately after the 
Civil War a branch was built near the western 
end of the line almost due south to Kansas City, 
thus forming a through route via the C.B.GQ. 
from Chicago by way of Galesburg, Quincy, Pal­
myra, and Cameron to Kansas City; the entire 
mileage came under Burlington control when the 
C.B.SQ. acquired the Hannibal & St. Joseph in 
1883. From 1869, when through service first be­
gan, until 1888, this was the most popular route 
between these two major cities. In the latter year, 
however, the Santa Fe completed its shorter line 
and from then on gradually took over the bulk of 
the traffic until, by the 1930’s, the Burlington's
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Chicago-Kansas City route was hopelessly out­
classed.
To Ralph Budd this was an intolerable situa­
tion. Next to Chicago, Kansas City was the most 
important gateway on the entire system; from it 
ran the Burlington rails northward toward Omaha 
as well as northeastward toward Chicago. Even 
more to the point, as Budd emphatically recog­
nized, the Chicago-Kansas City line pointed to­
ward the heart of the Southwest, an area that was 
increasingly generating more traffic.
It was entirely feasible to improve this line to 
make it fully competitive, and Budd proposed 
such a plan. Various circumstances prevented im- 
mediate undertaking of the project, and then 
World War II necessitated further postponement. 
Once the war was over and materials were again 
available, Budd turned to the situation in northern 
Missouri like a hound dog in full cry. The first 
thing he did was to persuade Isaac B. Tigrett, 
president of the recently-enlarged Gulf, Mobile & 
Ohio, to grant to the Burlington trackage rights 
between Mexico and Kansas City so that the Bur­
lington’s St. Louis-Kansas City service could com­
pete on equal terms with that of the other lines 
connecting those two cities. But this was only a 
first step, for Budd saw in it a possibility of solv­
ing the even more important Chicago-Kansas City 
problem. The Santa Fe had long been anxious to 
get into St. Louis. Why not, therefore, let the
Santa Fe into that city over the Burlington and in 
exchange obtain trackage rights over the Santa 
Fe’s short line from Kansas City to Bucklin, a 
point on the old Hannibal &  St. Joseph main line 
near Brookfield, Missouri?
As it turned out, the vigorous opposition of oth­
er railways serving St. Louis was sufficient to 
cause denial of the proposed exchange of facilities 
between the Burlington and Santa Fe. But hardly 
had the dust settled from that decision when Budd 
proposed building a cut-off over seventy miles 
long (including over forty-two miles of brand- 
new railroad) that would be, in effect, the chord 
of the arc formed by the old line through Cameron 
Junction. This plan the I.C.C. approved on Au­
gust 18, 1949, just a fortnight before Budd’s re­
tirement from the presidency. Thus in the very 
last moments of his administration, his patience 
and tenacity found another reward. The new rail­
road was opened for freight service in October,
1952, and for passenger business in February,
1953. Typically enough, however, Ralph Budd 
refused to permit the succeeding administration to 
name even a siding in his honor on the new line.
To Ralph Budd, World War II brought one 
specific responsibility which in itself tested his 
mettle and experience, not to say his energy, to 
the extreme. In May, 1940, President Roosevelt 
appointed him Transportation Commissioner on 
the Advisory Commission to the Council of Na-
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tional Defense. This meant, in effect, that he was 
responsible to the Federal Government for the 
performance of the nation's transportation plant 
during the crucial months of frantic preparedness. 
As he felt was his duty, he accepted the post im­
mediately despite the inevitable intensification 
of his concurrent responsibilities as president of 
the Burlington. For the next year and a half he 
shuttled relentlessly between Chicago and Wash­
ington yet, so far as anyone could see, the back­
breaking schedule failed even to dent his relaxed 
manner, his miraculous way of finding time to give 
full attention to all matters that warranted it, or 
his effervescent sense of humor.
The first problem Budd had to decide in Wash­
ington was whether to set up an entirely new, 
large organization to cover all phases of transpor­
tation throughout the country, or to use, when­
ever possible, existing organizations that already 
represented the carriers and the public. To choose 
the former course would have been squarely in 
the tradition of the contemporary administration, 
and might have been seized upon eagerly by any­
one wishing to achieve the sort of notoriety that 
inevitably focuses upon the head of any large or­
ganization. But characteristically enough, Budd 
chose the latter alternative. The Interstate Com­
merce Commission, he felt, was fulfilling its func­
tions efficiently, and he believed he could depend 
upon the Association of American Railroads, the
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American Trucking Association, the Lake Car­
riers Association and others to transmit and imple­
ment his top-level plans in respect to the carriers 
they represented. "Clearly it was in the interest 
both of efficiency and economy," he concluded 
simply, "to make use of the existing agencies as 
far as possible, rather than to establish duplicate 
and at least to some extent rival administrations." 
This, indeed, was a novel approach at the time. 
And it succeeded admirably.
Working through existing organizations, then, 
Budd with a tiny staff of eleven persons (includ­
ing stenographers and clerks) kept his finger on 
the pulse of the transportation system through a 
selected but highly informative series of statistical 
reports that reached his office daily. Armed with 
this information, which he could interpret into 
practical planning, his principal function was to 
make suggestions to the various carriers with the 
single objective of moving goods and people as 
rapidly and efficiently as possible.
There was a strong group within the govern­
ment at Washington that firmly believed the rail­
roads should be taken over to provide adequate 
transportation for the defense period and the pos­
sible war emergency to follow. Budd resisted this 
proposal firmly and successfully. To the statement 
that the railroads could not get the necessary 
equipment he replied that it would take no more 
material for the railroads to build cars and loco-
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motives than for the government to do so, and that 
all that was necessary to insure the best service 
was to let the railroads have the necessary tools to 
work with. To the railroads he recommended that 
the freight car pool be increased first to 1,700,000 
and then to 1,800,000 cars. The roads responded 
promptly and only the shortage of material pre­
vented their reaching the goal during his admin­
istration. At the same time, and at his urging, the 
railroads reduced the percentage of bad order cars 
to the lowest level in history. Along similar lines, 
approximately 1,000 new locomotives were ord­
ered and the percentage under repairs brought 
down. Shippers were urged to load cars promptly 
and to load them as heavily as possible.
In the motor carrier field, the Transportation 
Commissioner carried through a survey of all bus­
ses and trucks in the country and thus assembled 
in a single spot more detailed information on that 
subject than had ever before existed. Plans were 
also suggested and carried out for improved ac­
cess highways so as to relieve congestion, particu­
larly around defense production plants. A similar 
survey was made of equipment available for in­
land water transportation, while on the Great 
Lakes arrangements were completed for additional 
ice-breaking service that resulted, during 1941, in 
the longest navigation season in history; during 
that year the total movement of iron ore exceeded 
by nearly 15,000,000 tons the highest previous
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record. But it was typical that in making his re­
port Budd commented that, “In honesty it must 
be said that unusually favorable weather aided 
more in extending the season than did the facili­
ties.” What he did not point out was that had it 
not been for the moves he instituted, the record 
would have been substantially less impressive.
Other steps taken by the Transportation Com­
missioner can only be summarized. In order to 
provide adequate grain storage, a system was 
worked out so that grain was not loaded into cars 
that could not be promptly unloaded upon arrival 
at destination. Also to avoid congestion, all users 
of coal were urged to build up their stocks during 
the summer against the inevitable demands of win­
ter. In order to provide enough passenger cars to 
move troops, railroads were urged to increase their 
standby fleet by discontinuing unnecessary trains 
and by combining others whenever it could be 
done without serious inconvenience to the public. 
At the same time Budd fought a prolonged battle 
to obtain vital materials for all carriers. He urged 
abandonment of unnecessary facilities, concentra­
tion of scrap metal, and the granting of priorities 
for essential parts. A great deal of attention was 
devoted to making an inventory of storage space 
available for materials and food stuffs; an inven­
tory of quite a different kind pinpointed those stra­
tegic rail and port facilities that required special 
protection against possible sabotage.
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With the entry of the United States into war in 
December, 1941, Budd’s organization was taken 
over by the newly-created Office of Defense 
Transportation under the direction of Joseph B. 
Eastman, and once again Budd was able to devote 
his full time to the Burlington. No one was more 
emphatic than Eastman himself in recognizing and 
stating what Budd had done in preparing the 
transportation facilities of the nation for the even 
greater task that lay ahead.
When Ralph Budd became president of the 
Burlington at the beginning of 1932, its financial 
fortunes were at the lowest ebb in years. During 
the first year of his administration funded debt 
was nearly $220,000,000, fixed charges nearly 
$9,500,000, while gross revenues had sunk below 
$80,000,000 leaving a net income of barely $1,- 
500,000. By 1941 moderate recovery was in sight; 
gross had climbed gradually to $117,000,000 and 
net to over $ 10,000,000. But at the same time fixed 
debt had reached a peak of $251,000,000 while 
interest charges had mounted to $9,800,000. The 
impact of war traffic inevitably brought greater 
revenue. In fact, gross for 1945 reached what was 
then an all-time high of over $242,000,000 while 
net rose to over $27,000,000.
Gratified as he was by these results, Budd real­
ized early in the war that so long as the funded 
debt and interest charges remained high, the Bur­
lington would be ill-equipped to spend what
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would be needed to refurnish the plant after hos­
tilities ceased or to withstand hard times later on. 
Consequently as soon as earnings warranted it, 
in 1942, he began purchasing and retiring out­
standing bonds. In 1944 he devised and launched 
an inclusive program of debt reduction. As a re­
sult, in the six years 1942-1947, inclusive, funded 
debt, including equipment obligations, was re­
duced by nearly $70,000,000, while interest 
charges fell from over $9,800,000 to less than $5,- 
800,000. This sort of achievement can be ex­
pressed only in figures that are inevitably dull, but 
it was noted with profound respect in railway and 
investment circles. As Adams & Peck of New 
York observed in March, 1948, for example:
“ M uch of the  p rogress achieved by the C hicago, B urling ­
ton &  Q uincy  is d irectly  a ttrib u tab le  to an  u ltra -p ro g res ­
sive m anagem ent. T h is  road  w as a p ioneer in the  use of 
Diesel locomotives, stream lined  passenger tra ins, and  fast 
schedule freight operations. T h e  aggressive policy of debt 
reduction follow ed in recent years is an o th er indication of 
a w ideaw ake m anagem ent.”
Meanwhile, Budd continued his search for any­
thing that would make his railway’s service more 
efficient and more attractive. There was no more 
spectacular symbol of his success than the nation s 
first dome car.
The idea first occurred to C. R. Osborne, a 
General Motors executive, while riding through 
Glenwood Canyon in a caboose. Why, he rea-
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soned, couldn t a cupola be built on a passenger 
car so that travelers could enjoy the very sort of 
magnificent scenery he was then passing? Since 
General Motors was not building new types of 
automobiles at the moment because of wartime re­
strictions, their styling department had time to 
make a mock-up of a dome car. Quite frankly, the 
manufacturers were highly doubtful whether the 
conservative railway industry would adopt any­
thing so radical and so costly to build. “Well 
show it to Budd,” Osborne decided, then added, 
so the story goes, “If he doesn’t like it we’ll take 
an ax and chop the thing to bits.’’
Let Ralph Budd pick up the story from there: 
After seeing it, it seemed to me it was worth try­
ing out and I asked Mr. Osborne if there were 
any objections to our taking a stainless steel coach 
which was in Aurora, and cutting a hole through 
the roof and building a dome in it. He said he 
wouldn’t object at all; . . . some of his associates 
were very helpful to us in making plans, and we 
did build a dome from a coach.’’
This sober account hardly tells the full story. 
The moment that the car was put into regular ser­
vice on one of the Twin City Zephyrs on July 23,
1945, it made an instant hit. Another car was con­
verted at once so as to afford simultaneous service 
in each direction, and before the year was out five 
“Vista Domes’’ had been ordered for each of the 
new Twin City Zephyrs as well as for each of the
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six California Zephyrs then on order. As was the 
case with the Diesel engine, Budd had again cap­
tured a “first” for the Burlington.
It would take a book to tell the full story of 
Budd’s seventeen brilliant years on the Burling­
ton; entire chapters could well be devoted to mat­
ters that cannot be elaborated here, such as his 
making the system a leader in the fields of central­
ized traffic control, radio communication, fast 
freight operation, and the like, or his training of 
men like Fred Gurley, John Farrington, Fred 
Whitman, Harry Murphy, and A. E. Perlman, 
all of whom have gone on to head great railways. 
In the words of the distinguished editor of Rail­
way Age, when Budd retired in 1949, the Bur­
lington was “principally the ‘lengthened shadow’ 
of Ralph Budd.”
Richard C. O verton
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